METHOD FOR PERMITTING TWO PARTIES TO ESTABLISH
CONNECTIVITY WITH BOTH PARTIES BEHIND FIREWALLS


Background of the Invention

[0001]     This invention relates to methods for

5    enabling communication between communications systems
in an open data network.  In particular, this invention
relates to methods for establish connectivity between
two secure communications systems located behind
firewalls.

10   [0002]     Recently, it has become common for
communications systems having some processing
capabilities and access to an open data network (i.e.,
the Internet) to communicate with each other through
the network.  Typically, the communications systems

15   transmit data to each other in packets, which are
delivered using a suite of standard protocols known as
Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).
It should be understood by one skilled in the art that
these packets may include data packets, control packets

20   such as TCP packets or other types of packets defined
by the relevant protocol for performing similar
functions, and any other suitable packets.

[0003]    The IP is a network layer protocol that facilitates the transmission of packets between remotely-located communications systems through the use of an IP address that is unique to each remote system. The TCP protocol is a transport-layer protocol riding atop the IP.   The TCP provides a full-duplex byte stream between applications, whether they reside on the same machine or on remotely-located machines. The TCP ensures that transmitted packets are received in the same order in which they were transmitted.

[0004]    One of the most important features of TCP/IP is that it is an "open" protocol that enables anyone who wishes to implement it to do so.   While TCP/IP makes it relatively simple for systems to transmit packets to each other, it does not provide a robust mechanism for authenticating these packets.   Therefore, communications systems that use TCP/IP to communicate with remote systems in the open data network run the risk of inadvertently accepting malicious packets from unreliable remote sources.

[0005]    One way to minimize such risks is through the implementation of a firewall.   A firewall is a security system that acts as a protective boundary between one or more communications systems in a "private" network and the open data network.   Typically, the firewall monitors all aspects of the communications that are transmitted between the private network and the open data network.   More specifically, the firewall inspects the source and destination addresses of each packet that passes through.   To prevent unsolicited traffic from the open data network from entering the private network, the firewall keeps a table of all communications that have originated from the private

communications systems.  All inbound traffic from the
open data network is compared against the entries in
the table.  The firewall permits only inbound traffic
that have a matching entry in the table indicating that
5    the communication exchange was initiated from a private
communications system within the firewall to pass.  The
firewall drops all communications that originate from a
source that is outside of the firewall, thus preventing
common hacking attempts.  Most of the time, the
10   firewall does not inform the private communications
system before discarding unsolicited communications.
[0006]    Most communications systems connect to the
open data network through a shared gateway (e.g.,
provided by an Internet Service Provider).  These
15   shared gateways often provide Network Address
Translation (NAT), an Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) standard, as a means of connecting multiple
communications systems on a private network to the open
network using a single shared public IP address.
20   Although NAT is mainly deployed to solve the IP address
scarcity problem, it also provides a layer of obscurity
for the communications systems in the private network.
Because communications systems located outside of the
private network can only obtain the public IP address
25   of the NAT device providing NAT, the private address of
each individual communications system in the private
network is protected.  Although NAT is not the same
thing as a firewall, they are often provided in
conjunction with each other by the gateway server.
30   [0007]    With increased security provided by the
firewalls and NAT devices comes decreased accessibility
to communications systems.  It is especially
problematic for communications systems located behind

firewalls that prevent communications that have
originated from outside the firewalls to establish
direct communication with other remote systems.

[0008]     Therefore, it is desirable to provide a
communications scheme that enables two communications
systems, each located behind a firewall, to directly
communicate with each other.

[0009]     It is also desirable to provide such a direct
communications scheme between communications systems
located behind firewalls that additionally include a
network address translation device for implementing
network address translation (NAT).

Summary of the Invention

[0010]     It is an object of this invention to provide
a communications scheme that enables two communications
systems, each located behind a firewall, to directly
communicate with each other.

[0011]     It is also an object of this invention to
provide such a direct communications scheme between
communications systems located behind firewalls that
additionally include a network address translation
device for implementing network address translation
(NAT).

[0012]     In one embodiment of the invention, a
communications scheme enables a trusted central
communications station to assist two remote
communications systems, located behind firewalls that
prevent communication initiated from an external data
network, to establish direct communication with each
other.  According to this embodiment, each remote
communications system separately initiates connection
with the central communications station and obtains

from it the connection information (IP address, port, etc.) of the other remote communications system. The remote communications systems then transmit data to each other using the central communications station's connection information as their data's source information. Through this method of disguising the true source of their packets, each communications system effectively "spoof" the other into believing that the data is coming from the central communications station with which the communications system has an existing secure connection.

[0013]     In another embodiment of the invention in which the firewalls additionally include a NAT device for implementing network address translation, the remote communications systems, through the central communications station, exchange connection information for establishing a new TCP connection. The remote systems then establish an entirely separate TCP connection with each other by completing a three-way TCP handshake with the assistance of the central communications station.

Brief Description of the Drawings

[0014]     The above and other objects and advantages of the invention will be apparent upon consideration of the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which like reference characters refer to like parts throughout, and in which:

[0015]     FIG. 1 is a simplified schematic diagram of a communications scheme in which remote communications systems communicate with a central communications

station via an open data network in accordance with the present invention;

[0016]    FIG. 2 is a simplified schematic diagram of a communications scheme that enables two remote communications systems located behind firewalls to communicate directly with each other according to the invention;

[0017]    FIG. 3 is a simplified schematic diagram of the network access translation process in accordance with the present invention;

[0018]    FIG. 4 is a simplified schematic diagram of a three-way TCP handshake in accordance with the present invention;

[0019]    FIGS. 5A and 5B are two portions of a simplified schematic diagram of a communications scheme that enables two remote communications systems located behind firewalls that additionally include NAT devices that implement NAT to communicate directly with each other according to the invention; and

[0020]    FIGS. 6A and 6B show steps illustrating data exchanges among two remote communications systems and a central communications station in establishing a direct TCP connection between the remote communications systems according to the invention.

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0021]    The present invention recognizes that communication functions such as Internet, electronic mail, and other public data network functions are made readily available to users of communications systems having some processing capabilities and network access (e.g., personal computers, digital televisions, wireless devices, premises security systems, etc.).

The present invention also recognizes that
communications systems may wish to securely communicate
with each other even though the systems are often
ignorant of the connection information of other systems
5    with which they wish to communicate.  The present
invention additionally recognizes that many
communications system are configured to securely
communication with at least one central communications
stations (e.g., a premises security system and a
10   central station), which has the ability to securely
communicate with multiple remote communications
systems.

[0022]    In accordance with one aspect of the present
invention, an Internet connection between a remote
15   communications system and a central communications
station can be used for reliable secure communications.
Both of the problems of security and authentication may
be solved by using shared private key encryption.  For
example, each remote communications system may be
20   provided with a unique private key.  The same private
key may be known by the central communications station.
When the central communications station communicates
with the remote communications system, it is able to
decrypt the communication with the private key
25   associated with that remote communications system thus
ensuring that the communication is secure.  Other forms
of authentication, such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL),
may also be implemented by the central communications
station and the remote communications system to ensure
30   secure communication.

[0023]    Because secure communication may be ensured
between a remote communications system and a central
communications station, which communicates securely

with multiple remote communications systems, the
central communications station may assist multiple
remote communications systems to communicate with each
other.

[0024]    The invention will now be described with
reference to FIGS. 1-6.

[0025]    A generalized communications scheme that
enables a communications system 101 having control
circuitry 102 to communicate with a secure central
communications station 103 according to the present
invention is shown in FIG. 1.  Control circuitry 102
may be based on any suitable processing circuitry 104
such as processing circuitry based on one or more
microprocessors, microcontrolcontrollers, digital
signal processors, programmable logic devices, etc.
Memory (e.g., random-access memory and read-only
memory), hard drives, DVD drives, CD drives, or any
other suitable memory or storage devices may be
provided as storage 105 that is part of control
circuitry 102.  In accordance with one embodiment of
the invention, memory 105 may store a private key,
which may be used to initiate secure communication with
central communications station 103.

[0026]    Information generated by processing
circuitry 104 may be displayed to a user on
display 106.  Display 106 may be a monitor, a
television, or any other suitable equipment for
displaying visual images.

[0027]    A user may control the control circuitry 106
using user input interface 107.  The user input
interface 107 may be any suitable user interface, such
as one or more of a mouse, trackball, keypad, keyboard,

touch screen, touch pad, voice recognition interface, remote control, or any other suitable input device.

[0028]     Control circuitry may also include network access 108 for connecting to a private network and/or an open data network 110 such as the Internet.  Access by communications system 101 to open data network 110 may be controlled by firewall 111.  Firewall 111 may be any combination of hardware and software suitable for filtering traffic between communications system 101 and open data network 110.  According to this embodiment, firewall 110 allows outbound data traffic originated from communications system 101, as well as inbound data traffic responsive to those outbound data traffic, to pass, while preventing inbound data traffic associated with communications initiated from open data network 110 from reaching communications system 101.

[0029]     In accordance with one embodiment of the invention, firewall 111 may also include Network Access Translation (NAT) device 109.  NAT device 109 may be any suitable combination of hardware and software for translating private address information associated with outbound data traffic from communications system 101 into public address information before sending the data traffic to open data network 110.  Functions of NAT device 109 will be discussed in more detail in connection with FIG. 3.

[0030]     Central communications station 103 may be a system that is similar in basic configuration to communications system 101.  Central communications station 103 may additionally include resources that enable it to communicate securely with multiple remotely-located communications systems 101 where each communications system 101 is provided with the

necessary connection information (e.g., IP address, port address, etc.) to initiate communication with central communications station 103. According to one embodiment, central communications station 103 may

5 include secure redirectors 112. Secure redirector 112 may have access to private key storage 113, which, according to one embodiment, may store a private key for each communications system 101 with which central communications station 103 communicates.

10 Redirectors 112 may perform the encryption and decryption using those stored keys to authenticate communications systems 101 having corresponding private keys. According to another embodiment, central communications station 103 may securely communicate

15 with communications systems 101 using other known methods such as through the implementation of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

[0031] In one embodiment of the present invention, communications system 101 may be a premises security

20 system having monitoring and alarm capabilities. In such an embodiment, central communication station 103 may act as a central station to which the premises security system may report emergencies as well as monitoring information. If a premises system includes

25 a video camera for monitoring the premises, central communications station 103 may allow a user away from the premises at another communications system 101 to securely access video feed from the video camera, for example, by using redirector 112 to relay the video

30 feed to the user. A premises security system of this type is disclosed in copending, commonly-assigned United States Patent Application No. 09/805,864, which

is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

[0032]    In another embodiment, central communications system 103 may enable two communications systems 101, each secure behind its respective associated firewall and ignorant of the other's connection information (e.g., IP address, port address, etc.), to communicate with each other by allow each remote system 101 to separately initiate secure communication with central communications station 103 (e.g., using secure methods mentioned above) and then relaying their messages to each other using secure redirectors 112.

[0033]    While such a three-way relay scheme ensures security, it may also place a strain on bandwidth available to the central communications station, especially when a large number of subscribers use the relay service at one time or when large amounts of data such as video are transmitted between communications system.

[0034]    In accordance with the present invention, central communications station 103 reduces the strain on bandwidth by removing itself from, or reducing its participation in, the three-way conversation after helping the communications systems establish secure connection with each other.  FIG. 2 shows a simplified schematic diagram of one preferred embodiment in which two communications systems 201 and 202 communicate directly with each other without using redirectors 112 to relay the messages.  Consistent with the description in FIG. 1, both communications systems 201 and 202 (based on communications system 101) are located behind firewalls that only permit communications (e.g., TCP connections) originated from within the firewalls.  In

this embodiment, neither communications systems is associated with a NAT device 109 that provides network address translation.

[0035]    To initiate communication with communications system 202, communications system 201 first initiates a secure TCP connection 203 with central communications station 103, and advises central communications station 103 that it wishes to communication with remote communications system 202.  Central communications station 103 authenticates communications system 201, for example, by comparing its private key with an appropriate key from private key storage 113 or by using any other suitable authentication methods. Central communications station 103 then obtains communications system 201's connection information, including its IP address and port address (e.g., 1.1.1.1:1234), and waits for communications system 202, with whom communications system 201 wishes to communicate, to initiate communication with it. Because central communications station 103 must wait for remote communications system 202 to initiate communication with it, the present invention works most efficiently in a communications scheme where remote communications system 202 frequently establishes communication with central communications station 113 (e.g., to report security status).

[0036]    When communications system 202 independently establishes secure TCP connection 204 with central communications station 103, central communications station 103 sends communications system 201's connection information (e.g., 1.1.1.1:1234) and a session key for its session with communications system 201 (e.g., generated by a session key

generator 114) to communications system 202. Central
communications station 103 concurrently obtains and
sends communications system 202's connection
information, including its IP address and port address

5    (e.g., 2.2.2.2:2345), and its session key for its
session with communications system 202 to
communications system 201.

[0037]    Now both communications systems 201 and 202
have the necessary connection information (IP address

10   and port address) to directly send packets to the
other. They must, however, overcome one more hurdle
before direct data exchange can occur. As mentioned
above, firewalls 111, behind which both communications
systems 201 and 202 are located, only permit

15   connections initiated from within the firewalls. Due
to this constraint, if communications system 201 were
to send packets directly to communications system 202
using its own IP address and port address as the source
IP address and source port address of those packets,

20   the packets will be dropped by firewall 111 associated
with communications system 202.

[0038]    According to the present invention,
communications system 201 overcomes this problem by
disguising its packets to communications system 202 so

25   they appear as if they have been sent by central
communications station 103. More specifically,
communications system 201 sends its packets to
communications system 202 using the IP address and port
address of central communications station 103

30   (3.3.3.3:80) as their source address and port
address (205). Thus, communications system 201
effectively "spoofs" communications system 202 into
accepting those packets believing that they came from

central communications station 103, with which it has

an existing secure TCP connection. Similarly,

communications system 202 transmits its packets to

communications system 201 using central communications

station 103's IP address and port address as the source

IP address and source port address thereby "spoofing"

communications system 201 into accepting its packets

(206). At this point, communications systems 201 and

202 are in direct communication with each other and

central communications station 103 is free to bow out.

[0039]    In the above embodiment, even though both

remote communications systems accept packets from a

source other than central communications station 103,

security is preserved because both remote

communications systems have been authenticated upon

their initial connections to central communications

station 103.

[0040]    One requirement of the above communications

scheme is that each remote communications system must

substitute central communications station 103's IP

address and port address as the source IP and source

port address of its outbound packets thereby "spoofing"

the other remote communications system into accepting

the packets. This requirement cannot be satisfied if

either remote communications system is sitting behind a

firewall that implements NAT, which automatically

replaces the source IP address of an outbound packet

with a public IP address assigned by the NAT device.

Essentially, NAT eliminates the ability to "spoof" as

described above.

[0041]    A basic understanding of NAT and the three-

way handshake required to establish TCP connectivity is

necessary in order to fully comprehend this problem in

establishing direct communication between two
communications systems located behind firewalls that
also implement NAT. It is understood by one skilled in
the art that the term "network address translation"

5      refers exclusively to the translation of private source
IP addresses into public source IP addresses by a NAT
device. When such a NAT device is used, no port
translation occurs. In other words, the private source
port address associated with a packet is allowed to

10     pass through the NAT device into the open data network
unchanged. It is also understood by one skilled in the
art that a network address port translation (NAPT)
device may be employed to perform both IP address and
port address translation. When a NAPT device is used,

15     both source IP address and source port address of a
packet that passes through the NAPT device are changed
before the packet is released into the open data
network. Accordingly, when references are made to a
NAT device in this application, the NAT device is

20     presumed to only perform IP address translations.
Separate references are made to a NAPT device when port
address translation is also performed by the device.
       [0042]    A simplified schematic diagram of network
address translation (NAT) in accordance with the

25     present invention is shown in FIG. 3. A communications
system 101 and a NAT device 109 as described in
accordance with FIG. 1 are shown where NAT device 109
provides network address translation for all outbound
traffic originated from communications system 101. In

30     accordance with this embodiment, a private IP address
(e.g., 1.1.1.1) may either be dynamically assigned to
communications system 101 through implementation of

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) or may be configured as a static IP address by an administrator.

[0043]    When an application (e.g., an e-mail application) residing on communications system 101 wishes to communicate with another remote communications system, communications system 101 opens a socket (a software object that connects an application to a network protocol) that is associated with a source IP address (e.g., 1.1.1.1), source port address (e.g., 1234), destination IP address of the remote communications system (e.g., 2,2,2,2), destination port of the remote system, (e.g., 80), and network protocol (e.g., TCP). When the application transmits information (e.g., an e-mail message) using TCP, the source IP address and source port address are inserted into the source fields of packet 301 (e.g., generated in association with the outbound e-mail message). The destination fields of packet 301 will contain the remote system's destination IP address and destination port address. Because the e-mail is directed to a remote system located outside of the private network to which communications system 101 belongs, communications system 101 forwards the packet to NAT device 109 for IP address translation before it is sent on its way into the open data network.

[0044]    NAT device 109, upon receipt of this outbound packet, creates a port mapping in its NAT table 302. The port mapping maintains information such as the destination IP address, destination port, external IP address of the NAT device, network protocol, internal IP address of communications system 101, and any other suitable information associated with the packet. NAT device 109 then translates the packet by swapping the

source IP field of packet 301 from the private,
internal IP address of communications system 101 to the
public, external IP address of NAT device 109. The
resulting packet 303 is then sent to the open data

5    network to eventually reach destination system 304.

[0045]    If a NAPT device is used in place of NAT
device 109, the translation performed on packet 301 by
the NAPT device may additionally include the step of
swapping the source port field of packet 301 from the

10    private, internal port address associated with
communications system 101 to the public, external port
address assigned by the NAPT device. Accordingly, the
port mapping created for packet 301 may also include
information such as the external port address of the

15    NAPT device.

[0046]    If destination system 304 sends a return
packet back to communications system 101, the packet
will be addressed to the external IP address (e.g.,
3.3.3.3) of NAT device 109 because that is what

20    destination system 304 obtains from the source IP field
of packet 303. NAT device 109 receives this packet
from destination system 304 and compares it to the port
mappings in NAT table 302. If NAT device 109 finds a
port mapping where the IP addresses, port addresses,

25    and protocol match that of the inbound packet, NAT
device 109 performs a reverse translation by replacing
the external IP address in the destination field of the
inbound packet with communications system 101's private
IP address. NAT device 109 then forwards the inbound

30    packet on the internal network to communications
system 101. If, however, NAT device 109 does not find
a corresponding port mapping in NAT table 302 for the

inbound packet from destination system 304, NAT device
109 discards the packet.

[0047]   A simplified schematic diagram of a three-way
TCP handshake to establish TCP connectivity in
accordance with the present invention is shown in
FIG. 4.   As briefly mentioned above, the TCP level of
the TCP/IP transport protocol is connection-oriented,
which means that before any data can be transmitted, a
reliable connection between the systems must be
obtained and acknowledged.   Specifically, TCP uses what
is known as a three-way handshake to establish a
connection between two remote systems wishing to
communicate with each other.   It should be understood
by one skilled in the art that while the present
invention is described primarily in connection with TCP
protocols, implementation of the present invention is
not limited to TCP protocols and may include any other
suitable protocols for performing similar functions.

[0048]   First, system A, wishing to communicate with
system B, sends a control packet (e.g., a TCP packet or
any other packet defined by the relevant protocol for
performing similar functions) containing a specific
control parameter SYN (synchronize sequence numbers) to
system B (401).   The parameter SYN indicates to
system B that system A wishes to establish a TCP
connection and to do so system B must synchronize its
sequence numbers to the sequence number indicated in
system A's control packet.   Also wishing to communicate
with system A, system B sends a control packet
containing control parameters ACK (acknowledgement
field significant) and SYN back to system A (402).
This control packet acknowledges system A's request for
synchronization and requests that system A also

synchronize to system B's sequence numbers. System B
additionally indicates that this acknowledgement is in
response to system A's previous SYN-flagged control
packet by providing in the control packet an

5      acknowledge number that is computed by adding one to
system A's sequence number received at 401.

[0049]    Once system A receives the SYN-ACK-flagged
control packet from system B, it sends back a final
control packet containing an ACK parameter and an

10     acknowledgement number generated by adding one to
system B's sequence number (403). When system B
receives this control packet, the three-way handshake
is completed and a reliable TCP connection is
established.

15     [0050]    With a basic understanding of NAT and TCP
handshake, it is easy to see why the "spoofing" method
described above does not work when the communications
systems are located behind firewalls that also
implement NAT. FIGS. 5A and 5B show an alternative

20     communications scheme that overcomes the potential
problems and enables two communications systems 501
and 502, sitting behind firewalls that implement NAT,
to communicate directly with each other without using
the "spoofing" method. In this embodiment, each

25     communications system 501 and 502 preferably includes a
system 101.

[0051]    As described in the previous communications
scheme, to establish communication with another
communications system, communications system 501 first

30     initiates, through its associated NAT device 503, a
full TCP connection 504 with central communications
station 103. Central communications station 103 again
obtains the connection information associated with

communications system 501, which in this case includes a translated IP address (e.g., 2.2.2.2) provided by communications system 501's NAT device 503 as described in FIG. 4. Central communications station 103 also receives from communications system 501 its next TCP connection information, which includes its next TCP port (e.g., 1234), sequence ID, etc., that may be used later to establish a new TCP connection with communications system 501 (see packet 505).

[0052] When communications system 502 initiates, through its NAT device 506, a full TCP connection 507 with central communications station 103, central communications station 103 obtains from system 502 its connection information, which includes its translated IP address (e.g., 4.4.4.4) provided by communications system 502's NAT device 504. Communications system 502 also sends to central communications station 103 its next TCP connection information (e.g., next port = 3456) as communications system 501 has done (see packet 508). Central communications station 103, at this point, sends the translated IP address and the next TCP connection information of each remote communications system to the other remote communications system (see packets 509 and 510).

[0053] Refer now to FIG. 5B. After receiving communications system 502's connection information from central communications station 103 as described above, communications system 501 attempts to initiate a normal TCP connection, as described in FIG. 4, with communications system 502 by directing a control packet (e.g., control packet 511) with a SYN flag to communications system 502's NAT 506 according to the received connection information (translated IP address,

next TCP port, sequence ID, etc.). Before sending the
SYN-flagged control packet, communications system 501's
NAT device 503 substitutes a translated public IP
address as the source IP for the control packet and

5    creates a port mapping in its NAT table, as described
in FIG. 3, waiting for acknowledgment from
communications system 502. This control packet,
however, will not be accepted by communications system
502's firewall. This is because both communications

10   systems' firewalls, as describer above, only permit
connections initiated from within the firewalls and
will not accept connection requests initiated from the
open data network.

[0054]    Despite the fact that communications

15   system 502 never received the control packet requesting
connection from communications system 501, it will
nonetheless be able to acknowledge communications
system 501's request because central communications
station 103 has previously forwarded communications

20   system 501's next TCP connection information to it.
Using the forwarded connection information,
communications system 502 unilaterally sends a control
packet (e.g., control packet 512) with an ACK-SYN flag
acknowledging communications system 501's connection

25   request to communications system 501's NAT 503.

[0055]    This time, communications system 501's NAT
device 503 accepts communications system 502's control
packet and directs it to communications system 501
based on the port mapping that it has waiting for this

30   acknowledgment in its NAT table. Upon receiving
communications system 502's acknowledgment,
communications system 501 can now send the final
acknowledgment control packet required for the three-

way TCP handshake back to communications system 502.
Communications system 502's NAT device 504 accepts this
final ACK-flagged control packet because a port mapping
has been created in its NAT table waiting for this
acknowledgment when it sent its control packet
requesting connection to communications system 501
earlier.  Thus, the three-way TCP handshake is
completed.  Central communications station is again
free to bow out and let communications systems 501 and
502 directly communicate with each other.

[0056]    Because communications system 501's initial
request for TCP connection with communications
system 502 (SYN) may time out before communications
system 502 has had a chance to respond, communications
system 501 may periodically resend the requesting
control packet (SYN) until a response is received from
communications system 502.

[0057]    It will be understood by one skilled in the
art that while communications system 501 is described
above as the system that initiates a new TCP handshake
with communications system 502, in practice, either
communications systems 501 or 502 may initiate the new
TCP handshake once it receives the appropriate next TCP
connection information of the other communications
system from central communications station 103.  It
will also be understood by one skilled in the art that
while the above description requires only one
communications system to send the initial SYN-flagged
control packet to the other communications system,
which unilaterally responds with an ACK-SYN flagged
control packet, in an embodiment where a communications
system is unable to send an ACK-flagged control packet
without having first sent a SYN-flagged control packet,

both communications system may send a SYN-flagged
control packet to the other communications system in a
symmetrical process before proceeding according to the
description above.

5   [0058]    FIGS. 6A and 6B show a flowchart comprising
steps illustrating data exchanges among two
communications systems (CSA and CSB) and a central
communications station (CCS) in establishing a direct
TCP connection between the communications systems as
10   described in connection with FIGS. 5A and 5B above.  At
step 601, CSA, through its NAT device, initiates and
completes a three-way TCP handshake with CCS (SYN-
ACK/SYN-ACK) thereby establishing full TCP connection
with CCS.  At step 602, CSB, through its NAT device,
15   also independently establishes full TCP connection with
CCS (SYN-ACK/SYN-ACK).

[0059]    At step 603, CSA sends to CCS, via its
existing TCP connection with CCS (established at
step 601), connection information for its next TCP
20   connection, which includes CSA's next TCP source port,
sequence ID, etc.  Similarly, CSB, at step 604, also
sends CCS, via its existing TCP connection with CCS
(established at step 602), connection information for
its next TCP connection, which includes CSB's next TCP
25   source port, sequence ID, etc.

[0060]    At step 605, CCS forwards to CSA, via its
existing TCP connection with CSA (step 601), connection
information for establishing a new TCP connection with
CSB, which includes CSB's NAT-translated public IP
30   address, CSB's next TCP source port (received from CCS
at step 604), sequence ID (received at step 604), etc.

[0061]    Refer now to step 606 of FIG. 6B, CSA, upon
receiving the necessary connection information to

establish a new TCP connection with CSB (step 605),
directs a control packet requesting TCP connection
(SYN) to CSB at step 606. CSA's requesting control
packet uses as its destination IP address and port,

5    CSB's NAT-translated public IP address and CSB's next
TCP source port that it has received from CCS (step
605). Upon sending this control packet, CSA's NAT
substitutes a translated public IP address as its
source IP. CSA's NAT also creates a port mapping in

10   its NAT table that enables the NAT to route CSB's
return control packet to CSA (see FIG. 3). CSB's NAT,
however, drops CSA's control packet because, as
previously mentioned, CSB's firewall only allows for
connections that are initiated from within the firewall

15   and not from the external network.

[0062]    This is solved, when CCS, at step 607,
forwards CSA's next TCP connection information (CSA's
translated public IP address, next TCP connection port,
sequence id, etc.), that it has received from CSA at

20   step 603, to CSB via its existing TCP connection with
CSB (step 602). Step 607 effectively informs CSB that
CSA is trying to establish a new TCP connection with it
and also gives CSB the necessary connection information
for CSB to direct Packets to CSA. Upon receiving CSA's

25   next connection information from CCS, CSB, never having
received CSA's TCP connection request, unilaterally
directs a control packet flagging ACK-SYN to CSA to
complete the second step in the three-way TCP handshake
(see FIG. 4) at step 608. CSB's NAT substitutes a

30   translated public IP address as the source IP for the
outbound control packet and creates a record in its NAT
table, which enables the NAT to route return packets
from CSA to CSB.

[0063]    CSA's NAT accepts CSB's packet as it has previously created a record in its NAT table when CSA sent its initial TCP connection request (SYN) to CSB (606), which now allows it to route return packets from CSB to CSA.  CSA, upon receiving CSB's packet (ACK-SYN), sends the final acknowledgment control packet (ACK) back to CSB.  CSB's NAT, having sent the ACK-SYN-flagged control packet to CSA, now also has a record in its NAT table, which allows it to route CSA's final ACK-falgged control packet to CSB.  At this point, the three-way TCP handshake is completed and a direct full TCP connection is established between CSA and CSB.

[0064]    As briefly discussed in connection with FIGS. 5B, CSA's initial request to CSB at step 606 may time out if CSA does not receive a control packet acknowledging its connection request from CSB.  To maintain an open session that will allow CSA's NAT to route CSB's return control packet to CSA, CSA may repeat step 606 periodically until a return acknowledgment packet is received from CSB.

[0065]    Also as mentioned in connection with FIGS. 5A and 5B, either CSA or CSB may initiate the three way TCP handshake by sending the SYN-flagged control packet to the other as described in step 606.  In an embodiment where either or both of CSA and CSB are restricted from unilaterally sending an ACK-SYN flagged control packet without having first initiated a new TCP connection by sending a SYN-flagged control packet, the restricted communications system may first send a SYN-flagged control packet before sending an ACK-SYN flagged control packet to the other communications system.  In other words, in such an embodiment, regardless of whether the other communications system

has sent a SYN-flagged control packet to it, the restricted communications system may consecutively send out a SYN-flagged control packet and an ACK-SYN-flagged control packet to the other communications system. For convenience, both communications systems may be configured to always send out a SYN-flagged control packet before sending an ACK-SYN-flagged control packet in a symmetrical process to prevent any potential problems.

[0066]     Such an arrangement, in which both communications systems independently initiates a TCP handshake with the other communications system in a symmetrical process (by sending a SYN-flagged control packet and an ACK-SYN flagged control packet), further enables the above communications scheme, which has been designed to work with NAT, to also work when one of the communications systems is behind a NAPT device.

[0067]     As described in connection with FIG. 6A, before each communications system can initiate a new TCP handshake with the other communications system, it must first receive from central communications station the next TCP connection information of the other communications system, which includes the other communications system's port address for its next TCP connection.

[0068]     When one of the communications systems is behind a NAPT device, which translates port addresses as well as IP addresses, it is difficult for that communications system to know how its port address will be translated by the NAPT device. This difficulty makes that communications system unable to provide accurate information about its next TCP connection port address to the central communications station to

forward to the other communications system. This will cause any packets (including the ACK-SYN flagged control packet) sent to the communications system behind the NAPT device by the other communications system to be dropped, because the destination port addresses of those packets will not match the port addresses in the table of the NAPT device. However, because the other communications system is not also behind a NAPT device and thus was able to provide its correct port address for a new TCP connection to the central communications station to be forwarded to the communications system behind the NAPT device, a new TCP connection can still be established when the communications system behind the NAPT device sends an ACK-SYN flagged control packet to the other communications system at the correct port address provided.

[0069]    Therefore, by requiring both communications systems to independently send to each other SYN and ACK-SYN flagged control packets in a symmetrical process, establishment of a new TCP connection between the two communications systems can be ensured as long as one of the communications system is not behind a NAPT device (only a NAT device).

[0070]    Thus it is seen that a secure communications scheme is provided that enables two secure communications systems to directly communicate with each other. One skilled in the art will appreciate that the present invention can be practiced by other than the described embodiments, which are presented for purposes of illustration and not of limitation, and the present invention is limited only by the claims that follow.